报告题目：Agent Incentives of Strategic Behaviors in Resource Sharing on P2P Networks
In this talk, we focus on the resource sharing over networks with autonomous participants (or agents), which goes beyond the peer-to-peer (P2P) bandwidth sharing idea. In such a resource sharing system, participants act as both suppliers and consumers of resources. Formally, this system is modeled as an undirected graph G, where each node i represents a peer with units of divisible resources (or weight) to be distributed among its neighbors. Each agent obtains the utility by exchanging its resources with its neighbors according to the preset rules. However, agents may play strategically to improve their utilities by influencing the allocation, since the allocation depends on what they submit. Recently we proved the truthfulness of a market equilibrium mechanism, which can be obtained by a combinatorial method, against strategic behaviors of edge deletion and weight cheating. Another kind of strategy, called Sybil attack, is also considered. A strategic agent plays the Sybil attack by disguising itself to create several copied false nodes with its resources assigning among them. We are interested in the robustness of the market equilibrium mechanism in withstanding such a strategy in terms of the incentive ratio to measure how much one could gain at most. A series of work have been done on the Sybil attack strategy against the market equilibrium mechanism on different kinds of graphs.